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When public-private partnerships are not what they might seem 
Findings from The Netherlands 
Accountability is an under researched aspect ofpublic-private partnerships. For partnerships to be 
successful, they must incorporate mechanisms that ensure that partners are answerable for their 
performance. Although it is often assumed that rendering an account is a straightforward process of 
monitoring contractual obligations, the literature suggests that many issues may arise in relation to 
holding service deliverers accountable in the context ofpartnerships. In this article we discuss findings 
of research conducted in The Netherlands in the social housing field. We argue that public-private 
parinerships, in the context of a quasi-market, did not introduce greater responsiveness through the 
accountability mechanisms of exit and voice. The reality was rather more complex, as accountability 
between local government and social landlords was ensured through sustained dialogue, fostered by a 
situation in which the two parties have found themselves in stable and enduring relationships of 
mutual dependence. 
1. Introduction 
From the 1980s onwards, several European countries have introduced public-private 
partnerships (PPP) into the implementation of social policy. In these contexts, it was 
envisaged that service deliverers, rather than being preferred suppliers, would com-
pete for funding and be subject to 'hard' contractual relationships. Such develop-
ments are described in other contributions to this themed issue. 
For partnerships to be successful, they must incorporate mechanisms that en-
sure that partners are answerable for their performance (Johnston/Romzek 1999: 
386). Although there is a host of literature on hierarchical accountability relationships 
between governments and service deliverers, there are few empirical studies on ac-
countability in partnerships — even though, as noted in this theme issue, partnerships 
are increasingly common. 
Unfortunately for governance [.. .] many of the shifts and reforms in govern-
ment programs are undertaken without much attention to accountability. [ . . . ] 
The presumption made is that market mechanisms will impose cost and quality 
discipline on contractors and that contracting monitoring, through auditing of 
expenditures of public funds, will be sufficient to assure fiscal accountability to 
government for contractual obligations (Johnston/Romzek 1999: 386). 
In fact, the empirical studies undertaken so far reveal critical issues such as failing 
market mechanisms, lack of transparency, cultural barriers and administrative bur-
dens. Whilst policymakers and administrators may consider that accountability is a 
straightforward aspect of partnerships, they might find that it may become their 
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Achilles' heel. The way in which accountability is shaped within a partnership reflects 
the underlying mechanisms that govern the relationship. As a consequence, examin-
ing accountability helps to debunk false assumptions about how partnerships operate 
in practice. In this article, we will therefore examine PPP through the lens of ac-
countability. 
We will contribute to knowledge on accountability in public-private partnerships 
by drawing on a case study in which social housing partnerships in The Netherlands, 
are examined using Hirschman's (1970) concepts of 'exit' and 'voice'. Our findings 
are that partnerships did not, as was the intention of policy makers, introduce greater 
accountability and responsiveness through market mechanisms. The reality was, in 
fact, rather more complex. The organisations were (to a great extent) accountable to 
government at the local level, through sustained dialogue in which competition 
played only a supporting role. 
2. Theoretical approach and methodology 
2.1 Theoretical approach 
Our analysis emerges from a social constructivist perspective — a view that reality is 
created by social action. In Weber's terms, social action is action that is invested with 
meaning and one that takes account of the actions of others (Weber 1968: 4). The 
creation of a socially constructed reality through action and interaction occurs be-
cause human beings have no biological mechanism that naturally selects and organ-
ises the relevant 'meaningful' aspects of the world. Since the actions undertaken serve 
as a reference point for the actions of others, effectively, reality is constructed jointly 
(Berger/Luckmann 1966). It can only exist as long as there is a degree of order, 
which consists of predictable and regular behaviour of actors at the level of the col-
lective. Individual social actions can reinforce or violate these collective regularities. 
The conceptual frame through which social realities are viewed fall squarely 
within neo-institutionalist organisational theory and specifically its cognitive pillar 
(for an overview of this literature, see Scott 1995). This conceptualises social reality in 
relation to views and methods of sense-making, which in some cases can acquire a 
'taken-for-granted' character. In this, it draws its inspiration from the work of Simon 
(1945) and his followers. It presupposes that the behaviour of actors is bounded by 
cognitive and moral templates for action, filters for interpretation, even when the 
actions pursued within those templates are rational. It is therefore not at odds with 
rational choice theory, but aims to reconstruct the cognitive frames within which 
preferences and actions are shaped and which reduces the uncertainties associated 
with action. There are two ways in which institutions reduce uncertainty. Firstly, 
actors are aware of their problems and how to handle them. Actors 
...live in murky worlds where it is never clear which actions have which conse-
quences. Yet, actors must construct an account of the world that interprets the 
murkiness, motivates and determines courses of action, and justifies the action 
decided upon (Fligstein 1996: 659). 
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Routines save actors from complexities they may not be able to handle. Secondly, the 
very fact that other actors have internalised the same concepts means they are bound 
to act in a predictable manner. This in itself reduces uncertainty. 
Our interpretation of accountability is informed by this perspective. We do not 
treat it, in Scott's terms, primarily as a regulative type of institution (i.e., with refer-
ence to procedures in a formal relationship), but rather as a relational concept, in 
which the institutional context shapes how accountability is perceived and enacted. 
2.2 Accountability as a relational concept 
Accountability is referred to in the literature as a difficult, complex and confounding 
term that eludes any clear and simple definition (Kramer 1989; Day/Klein 1987; 
Simey 1985). It is one of the "most loosely used" (Starks 1991: 135), ambivalent, 
elusive, ambiguous, problematic, "multifaceted" (Kearns 1996: 179), complex and 
confusing terms; a concept "that has been extended in a number of directions well 
beyond its core sense" (Mulgan 2000: 555) and "that is taken to mean everything . . . 
[which] . . . effectively means nothing" (Cutt/Murray 2000: 1). Accountability is re-
ferred to as a "chameleon word" (Day/Klein 1987: 32) which evades any simple 
definition and a "vexed issue" (Hunter 1992: 436) that has "exercised academic ob-
servers ... [among others] . . . for many years" (ibid) since the accountability concept 
encompasses "many meanings and dimensions" (Day/Klein 1987: 249). In fact, the 
only agreement about accountability appears to be that: there is little agreement about 
what it means and it embraces a range of meanings. 
For instance, for Simey (1985: 20), accountability is a moral principle - the "ba-
sis for a relationship between . . . those who govern and those who consent to be 
governed", whilst for Stewart (1992: 4), to be accountable means to be able to "ac-
count for actions taken and being held to account for those actions". Mulgan (2000: 
555) suggests that Stewart's approach, where one is called to account, is one aspect of 
accountability "on which all are agreed" and given this agreement about accountabil-
ity as a relationship between 'those who account' and 'those who are accounted to', 
we analyse the concept in these terms. Accountability as a relational concept can be 
enacted at many levels and can be between individuals, groups and (or) organisations. 
This definition acknowledges that the concept refers to a pattern of behaviour, where 
obligation is a key element. Accountability is a complementary, though unequal rela-
tionship, where one is obliged to account to the other (at the individual, organisa-
tional or inter-organisational levels). 
Although accountability has received attention in the context of hierarchical re-
lationships, relatively little is known about how it is enacted in the context of public-
private partnerships. 
Compared to what has been written about accountability in and of single, auto-
nomous, hierarchic organizations, little has been written on accountability in the 
context of interorganizational networks and public-private partnerships 
(Acar/Robertson 2004: 331). 
The small number of empirical studies on the topic suggest a wide variety of complex 
issues: a lack of clearly agreed upon targets; the absence of performance data; dis-
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gruntled professionals who feel they are being held to account by people with less 
training than they have; administrative burdens that are expensive and exceed capac-
ity (Johnston/Romzek 1999; Romzek/Johnston 1999; Acar/Robertson 2004; Flin-
ders 2005). Fundamentally, these issues can be traced back to the absence of well-
functioning mechanisms of accountability. Here, these mechanisms are theoretically 
specified in relation to the work of Hirschman (1970). 
2.3 Mechanisms of accountability 
Hirschman (1970) suggests two alternatives for action within accountability relation-
ships by which customers can express dissatisfaction with services or products they 
receive. For Hirschman (1970: 4) the "exit option" is the ability to find an alternative: 
"Some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the or-
ganization". The "voice option" is the way customers or members can influence an 
organisation through: (a) articulating their views; or (b) ensuring that their dissatisfac-
tion and complaints are registered through protest. This results in management at-
tempting to address possible causes of customer/member dissatisfaction, which is 
the case irrespective of whether or not the 'exit' option exists (Hirschman 1970: 92). 
Within our approach, exit and voice are interpreted as social actions shaped by the 
institutional environment. This institutional environment includes not only the sys-
tem of governance (e.g., formal accountability procedures) but also current under-
standings of accountability and the significance that specific types of action, such as 
exit and voice, have in relation to it. 
The exit option means that government or users of services have the option to 
switch to other providers when services delivered are judged not to be at the appro-
priate or requisite quality. For instance, when a procurer of a service is dissatisfied 
with the price/quality ratio of a provider in the fields of health care or education, 
such as a hospital or school, for instance, it can direct its patients or clients (and the 
money that follows them) to another. The same may apply at the individual level: 
when a patient or client is dissatisfied with services received, he or she may switch to 
another facility. Greater accountability is therefore ensured by the possibility of exit 
and its consequence — the service deliverer's loss of revenue. Of course, this mecha-
nism only functions if the procurer is able to leave. 
Voice potentially offers an alternative mechanism to exit, by allowing users to 
express dissatisfaction about services whilst remaining loyal — at least for the time 
being. For instance, in the health care context patients may be members of commit-
tees, which include representatives of management, where management and service 
quality issues are discussed. The issue here is that this can only work if users of ser-
vices are actually in a position to exert real influence over the nature of services — by 
which we mean that they are able to articulate their interests and that management 
listens — whether in response to the possibility of exit, or for other reasons. 
2.4 Methodology 
Empirical findings are based on research conducted in The Netherlands comprising 
twelve organisations in four localities and a total of 42 semi-structured interviews 
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(approximately one third with employees of social housing, one third with local gov-
ernment representatives and one third with users of services - tenants). The inter-
views, which ranged between 1.5 to 3 hours, covered the six themes (i.e., interven-
tions in stock, distribution, interorganisational collaboration, legal structure, tenant 
consultation, and internal structure) and were transcribed verbatim. 
These themes captured the relationships with most of the major actors in the lo-
cal network and formed the basis for the reconstruction of the cognitive schemes 
underpinning decision-making patterns. Interview data were supplemented with ex-
tensive documentary analysis and observation of user-management meetings. Data 
were analysed using an advanced coding system. Cases varied according to size of 
locality and the degree to which there was available accommodation in relation to 
demand in local housing markets. 
After a brief description of the policy field studied, we discuss the concept of 
accountability in relation to exit and voice in the context of public-private partner-
ships, as well as alternative mechanisms that appear to have emerged. 
3. The Policy Field: Dutch Social Housing 
Over 40% of the Dutch housing stock consists of rental housing, of which approxi-
mately 80% is social housing (Ministry of Housing 2004). The latter is virtually mo-
nopolised by private non-profit (third sector) landlords, which were the preferred 
suppliers in the post-war reconstruction boom, unlike other countries (such as Ger-
many and the UK) where this role was fulfilled by municipalities. The legal form is 
usually that of a foundation, which is both independent and not formally linked to 
either local or central governments. 
The origins of this system can be traced back to the 19th century when the qual-
ity of housing in many Dutch cities was deplorable. When Holland's industrialisation 
brought increasing numbers of workers to the major urban areas, great shortages 
arose. Housing that private landlords were able or willing to offer was either insuffi-
cient or too expensive or of poor quality. The result was that major cities were fre-
quently confronted by disease and social unrest - plagues and riots. Such public 
health and social problems finally led social and political elites to pay attention to the 
housing question. This was not regarded as an issue of significance in itself, but 
rather as part of the more general 'social question' of pacifying the working class and 
integrating them into existing social structures. Attention to housing issues was gen-
erated then not solely by compassion and notions of solidarity, but also by self-
interest. After all, the establishment could only benefit from an economically ade-
quate resource pool of labour, and they feared further social upheaval. 
The first initiatives for improving housing did not come from the state. Rather, 
at the local level, wealthy citizens made efforts to alleviate the worst problems. From 
the mid-19 th century onwards, members of the upper classes and the industrial elite 
founded housing associations - which were private philanthropic organisations -
providing rental housing for the working class. That said - rents were pegged at lev-
els that were unattainable to all but the 'rich poor' - the educated and well-paid work-
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ing class. Until after the Second World War, this remained a relatively small segment 
of overall housing provision and did little to alleviate the shortages. 
This dramatically changed in the period of post-war reconstruction. At the end 
of the Second World War, the country faced immense housing shortages, higher than 
that of most European countries. During the occupation, construction had ground to 
a halt and many dwellings had been destroyed. These developments had added sig-
nificantly to the great shortages that had already existed before the war. In other 
words, it was time to start building. However, the housing market of the time was 
still wholly incapable of meeting need. The government needed to act. With broad 
support, it enacted a large-scale construction programme with extensive financial 
support. From this point, private housing associations gradually developed into the 
most important agents in the implementation of national housing policy favoured by 
both the right and the left. 
During post-war reconstruction, the originally philanthropic housing initiatives 
received major subsidies and were drawn into the public housing sphere, to the point 
where they had little autonomy left, even though they remained formally private.1 
The period of 1945-1989 was one of explosive growth and bureaucratisation. Due to 
major planning errors, housing reconstruction in The Netherlands dragged on far 
longer than in most other countries, eventually resulting in a social housing stock of 
well over a third of the total housing stock. Despite the important role of private 
non-profit organisations, public policy in this area was very much centralised, espe-
cially in the early post-war period. The state hierarchically determined the size and 
nature of the building programmes on the basis of estimates of need and building 
capacity. Regulation of rents diminished the scope for negotiation between tenants 
and landlords, which led to an extension of tenant protection. Housing distribution 
was strictly regulated through a system of permits and distribution criteria, so that 
scarcely available space might be allocated as fairly as possible. In short, nearly all 
phases of housing provision were under direct state control. Housing associations 
became in effect little more than extensions of government. 
However, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, public regulation and funding 
of social housing were significantly scaled back, and social landlords were effectively 
re-privatised (Ministry of Housing 1989). Housing regulation was liberalised, both for 
supply and demand. On the demand side, the freedom for individuals to choose their 
place of residence was also increased considerably. It was no longer as easy for local 
authorities to refuse access to their local housing markets. On the supply side, social 
housing providers gained greater freedom in making their own decisions. Their ability 
to set their own prices was significantly increased. They used to be obliged to in-
crease their prices by a fixed annual percentage; after a period of gradual relaxation, 
the government only set maximum and average rent increases, with providers free to 
create variation in their overall stock. 
1 The Dutch welfare state is a hybrid of corporatist and social-democratic regime types, 
according to the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), but the governance of social hous-
ing was traditionally clearly organised along corporatist lines. Originally, there were links to 
religious and ideological pillars, which have now all but vanished. 
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Since then, social landlords have operated with a great measure of autonomy. 
Although central government sets performance targets, which are enshrined in the 
Besluit Beheer Sociale Huursector (BBSH, Regulation on the Governance of the Social 
Rented Sector), these are broadly defined, and monitoring and supervision are lim-
ited. Since they are able to finance their activities from the revenues of rents and 
sales, they can operate virtually without subsidies from national government. Funds 
for new construction are acquired through the private market. Whilst local govern-
ment remains an important partner to social landlords, by virtue of their legal respon-
sibilities in urban planning and local social policy, the former has no control over the 
latter. The change of system was a deliberate attempt to shift policymaking to the 
local level. Targets emerging from the negotiations were meant to strike a balance 
between public and private responsibilities. 
Social housing is typically for rent, though there is an increase in sale and inter-
mediary forms of ownership. By virtue of its size, Dutch social housing is not tar-
geted at the poorest at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, as in many other 
countries. Since social landlords own over 30% of all housing stock, they cover a 
broad segment of the population, including the middle classes. Increasingly, they are 
developing tailored housing for groups with specific needs, such as for older people 
or for people with disabilities. That means that it is virtually impossible for govern-
ment to initiate urban regeneration programmes or social interventions without in-
volving social landlords. 
All in all, the housing market that emerged was a complex quasi-market, which 
remains fundamentally unchanged (Ministry of Housing 2003). The basic features of 
the system can be summarised as follows. 
• Competition was the result of the decentralisation of financial risks, with providers 
that operate in one local market potentially competing for the same clients. 
• Regulation circumscribes the discretionary freedom of the parties involved and 
broadly defines the goals to which they should aspire, as defined in the BBSH. 
• hocal negotiation — the third basic ingredient and it is through this mechanism that 
the broad goals must be specified and realised. 
There currently are less than 500 independent social landlords, located mostly in 
urban areas. In recent years, there has been renewed debate about their performance, 
the scope of their activities, and their relationship with local and central government. 
Social landlords increasingly work with a variety of governmental, third sector and 
business partners to realise projects in the fields of social services, care for older 
people and neighbourhood planning (Brandsen/van Hout 2006). 
4. The Empirical Findings 
4.1 The Exit Mechanism 
To reiterate: the central assumption behind contractual partnerships is that the exit 
mechanism will ensure accountability to purchasers by service deliverers. For exit to 
work there has to be sufficient levels of competition between service deliverers. 
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However, empirical findings from The Netherlands research tends to indicate that 
competition was, at best, limited. 
In a competitive market, there is more than one buyer and one seller, and by 
implication there would be several procurers and service deliverers. However, the 
study found that as the exit mechanism was weak, there was no actual market, de-
fined in these terms. Prior to social landlords being given increased financial and 
regulatory autonomy in the early 1990s, many local areas were served by only one, or 
a few, social landlords. This concentration allowed for more efficient supervision by 
local government. 
During the 1990s, the social housing system shifted from one based on direct 
hierarchical government control to a market-based one. This concentration effec-
tively produced local monopolies and oligopolies. Subsequent developments did not 
significantly alter the situation. Whilst on the one hand, the introduction of new 
regulation made it easier for tenants to move to neighbouring areas, thereby raising 
the potential for exit, on the other, landlords simultaneously engaged in mergers. This 
effectively reduced their overall numbers from just over 800 organisations in 1990, to 
approximately 500 at present. In urban areas especially, the number of housing pro-
viders decreased dramatically. This was visible not only in the structure of regional 
housing markets, but also in the striking lack of any ethos of competitiveness among 
providers. 
For tenants dependent on social housing this, in effect, left them with little 
choice. It also meant that local government was, in practice, dependent on a small 
number of social landlords in their area, which, especially in large cities, control a 
major part of the housing stock. These social landlords are not under local authority 
control, but have financial resources that local government must mobilise if it is to 
realise plans for urban regeneration. This places social landlords in a strong negotiat-
ing position. There have been attempts to invite new entrants into local housing 
markets, but this has had little effect since it has usually related to the construction of 
new housing, which makes up only a tiny fraction of the overall housing stock. Both 
tenants and local governments must therefore deal with a small number of existing 
social housing providers. 
In this market then, there were few 'exit' opportunities for either. Thus, local 
government effectively had no choice but to collaborate with these particular organi-
sations, at least in the short and even the medium term. The exit mechanism fails to 
guarantee accountability. Since the exit mechanism was the foundation of the quasi-
market system, this has serious implications. The finding that the choice of service 
providers remains limited and had not, as perhaps envisaged, been improved by the 
process of contracting, is supported by earlier studies by Le Grand et al. (1998), 
Spurgeon et al. (1997), Walsh (1995), and Flynn and Hurley (1993). 
4.2 The Voice Mechanism 
In theonr, in the absence of a functional competitive market the voice mechanism 
might be an alternative, albeit partial, means of ensuring accountability to purchasers. 
For an overall assessment of accountability, it is therefore necessary to judge the 
strength of voice together with the exit mechanism. 
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Although provision for beneficiaries of social housing to be accounted to 
through certain voice and bureaucratic mechanisms exists, the research found, like Le 
Grand et al. (1998: 27), that there was only " . . . anecdotal evidence" of such account-
ability mechanisms and there was " . . . no systematic information on the type, extent 
and consequences of such activities . . . " . Moreover, even when the voice mechanism 
existed, users were often effectively excluded from using it. Reasons for this included: 
(i) lack of a democratic structure/culture in the providers of social housing services; 
and (ii) opportunities for 'voice' which in practice were symbolic rather than opera-
tional. Tenant participation in such consultation meetings, where they existed, was 
tokenistic at best. 
During the 1990s, nearly all social landlords adopted the 'foundation' as their le-
gal form, abandoning their associative structures, because these were regarded as 
inappropriate for the new system of governance. As one manager argued, 
[A]n association is no longer adequate in this day and age. For a start, you're ab-
solutely inflexible. We had skinned the procedures to the point that it was rarely 
necessary to consult our members and still a small group managed to veto our 
budget for an entirely unrelated reason, simply because they wanted something 
we were not prepared to give. 
In order to compensate for the perceived loss of democratic accountability, na-
tional government introduced regulatory measures. Legally prescribed tenant associa-
tions were established to negotiate with managers about decisions affecting tenants. 
Shortly after financial risks were decentralised to social landlords, a new law on ten-
ant consultation was introduced to allow "tenants the opportunity to voice their 
opinion on matters that could be of real consequence to them" (Ministry of Housing 
1993, article 18). However, in practice, the research found that rights of these asso-
ciations varied widely. Some tenant associations were found to have formal voting 
rights in relation to major decisions, whereas others only had the right to express 
their opinions in relation to certain issues — without the social landlords having any 
obligation to respond to, let alone take account of, the tenants' views. Tenants were 
in many cases effectively excluded from key strategic or investment decisions. 
Moreover, in practice tenant participation was found to be stifled through or-
ganisational mechanisms which included few/no structures for them to raise con-
cerns and, when such structures existed, discouraged them from contributing agenda 
items for discussion. Furthermore, their concerns, when raised, were often not re-
corded in the minutes. Tenants also felt excluded and their voices silenced by: the 
formality of meetings; the use of jargon; the defensiveness of professionals; and their 
perceptions they were being ignored and not listened to. Another issue was the lack 
of recognition by managers of service users representing views other than their own. 
Housing management was increasingly discussed in instrumental terms, which left no 
room for dissonant perspectives and matters perceived as irrelevant from within that 
paradigm. Tenants' voices were rendered effectively mute because social housing 
provider representatives operated as cliques (Dalton 1959). This was found to be the 
case across the board and emerged from analysis of the data including documents, 
interviews (with tenant representatives and housing managers) and observation (of 
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consultation meetings) ,during which it became clear that tenants had little influence 
on managerial decision-making and conflicting perspectives were not voiced. 
But it was not simply a question of ill-will among managers. In those cases 
where managers did actively try to involve tenants in decision making, the voice 
mechanism also tended to function weakly. Even managers ardently committed to 
democratic decision making expressed disappointment at what they considered to be 
poor feedback and lacklustre participation. Suggestions put forward by tenants 
tended to focus on (what managers considered to be) trivial issues such as the re-
moval of graffit i and maintenance; not on what they regarded as major issues, such as 
organisational strategy and major decisions in relation to construction and regenera-
tion. Furthermore, managers were often concerned about whether tenant representa-
tives actually 'represented' their constituency as the majority of tenant respondents 
were men and very few were under fifty years of age. Finally, both tenant representa-
tives and managers argued that tenants found it difficult to use the voice mechanism 
when faced with highly technical decisions in relation to, for example, investment and 
rent calculation. However, it was precisely for this reason that many tenant associa-
tions were supported by professionals, funded either by the landlord or local gov-
ernment. When asked about this external professional support, one tenant replied: 
Thank God, yes. We wouldn't have been able to cope otherwise. Especially not 
at the beginning. What would I know about an issue such as rent differentiation? 
Yet there were concerns that this additional layer of professionals was, by virtue of 
their expert knowledge, too dominant within tenant associations, and that it was they 
who effectively made decisions on behalf of tenants. 
All in all, voice mechanisms, as indeed Hirschman (1970) predicts, do not on 
their own appear to constitute a credible alternative to choice. As with exit, there 
appear to be structural impediments to user participation, which are discussed here. 
4.3 Alternative Mechanisms? 
If exit and voice fail, are there any other mechanisms to ensure that service providers 
are responsive to users and accountable for their actions? The research findings indi-
cate that there may well be. Service providers and local government are interdepend-
ent. They are partners in actual need of active support of the other - without which 
each could not operate effectively. This interdependence ensured, at the very least, a 
measure of accountability in their relationship. 
Social landlords are legally required to negotiate and agree performance meas-
ures with local government, which are enshrined in a binding document. In this, local 
government acts as democratically mandated representatives of local citizens. That 
said, only a minority had actually initiated such agreements at the time of the re-
search. One reason for this may be that the formal contracting process is, in effect, 
merely a sideshow of broader informal negotiations in relation to urban development. 
Although historically the position of local government in relation to social landlords 
has steadily weakened, the former retain key competences in relation to urban plan-
ning and key services required to make property investment work. For instance, the 
physical renovation of poor/disadvantaged neighbourhoods is unlikely to be effective 
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when there is no simultaneous investment in social services and crime prevention. At 
the same time, local government cannot ignore social landlords since they own most 
of the housing stock in 'problem' areas and are major potential investors. They are in 
a mutually binding relationship. 
In many localities, the two parties settled uncomfortably into their new positions 
and had problems agreeing the terms of their relationship. As an official noted at the 
time, 
[W]hen I got involved with the programme in [...] everyone kept wishing me 
good luck. I was surprised to see what they were doing. Time appeared to have 
stood still in that place. The local authorities haven't yet made the transition. 
People still think in terms of their traditional roles. 
Local government had particular difficulty in adapting to its new role. It had lit-
tle formal power over social landlords, but considered that it should have, given its 
democratic mandate. Landlords, for their part, were keen to assert their new inde-
pendence and were unwilling to tie themselves up through contracts or other far-
reaching agreements. It was only from the second half of the 1990s onwards that, 
new patterns of stable working relationships were beginning to emerge. By this time, 
a new generation of bureaucrats had begun to rise through the ranks. They tended to 
adopt a pragmatic approach and appeared to be far more willing to think in terms of 
collaboration. 
This development has continued, albeit gradually. Although there are still locali-
ties where relationships can be characterised as antagonistic, it is becoming more 
usual - especially in large urban areas where the need for joint action is highest - for 
enduring relationships to become established and developed through plans for long-
term investment. Written agreements continue to be drawn up, although rather than 
a market tool, they are increasingly tools for structuring the negotiation process 
which was found to be conducted through dialogue. 
Accountability between local government and social landlords was therefore 
mainly ensured through the 'clan' mechanism (Ouchi 1980; 1979), through discourse 
as a form of mediation. New sets of relationships and new forms of 'partnership 
accountability' between the state and non-profit providers emerged as a result of the 
introduction of the quasi-market. Unlike the neo-classical economic notion of one-
off, arms-length exchanges, these relational accountability forms evolved as a result 
of the imperfections in the market. Specifically, given the ongoing working relation-
ships, conditions of incomplete information, and the necessarily incomplete and 
often largely implicit relational contracts that could not be specified fully in advance, 
local government and landlords became interdependent. The approach to the ac-
countability and contracting process by both parties was ensured through a two-way 
dialogue; to return to Sack's typology, it resembled an organisational partnership 
rather than a contractual partnership. 
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5. Analysis: The shift from contractual to organisational partnerships 
In our discussion so far we have concluded that exit and voice mechanisms in the 
contexts o f our studies have failed to ensure accountability. Is it possible for us to 
discern the reasons for this? Our research identified characteristics o f the services 
and the institutional legacy o f previous governance systems as the main reasons. 
However, these same characteristics encouraged dialogue and enduring relationships, 
which created new forms o f accountability. These are discussed in the next section. 
5.1 Obstacles to Voice and Exit 
Initially, specific characteristics o f the services researched appeared to be barriers to 
effective exit. In Dutch social housing, barriers to entry are high, given the enormous 
investment required over a prolonged period. As a consequence, it is disadvantageous 
for government to allow providers to exit from the market, as this would result in an 
even higher concentration o f housing stock in the hands o f fewer social landlords. 
The institutional heritage tended to exacerbate such effects. As already noted, social 
landlords had historically been 'clustered' together to allow efficient bureaucratic 
supervision by local governments, which retained regulatory control over social hous-
ing during much o f the post-war reconstruction period. With the introduction o f the 
quasi-market, this concentration led to an overall fragmentation o f the social housing 
market into regional clusters. Since most tenants tend to move only within certain 
geographical limits, this is a distinct disadvantage, as it has left them with little if any 
option to switch providers. 
Service characteristics also inhibited voice. Services were managed by profes-
sionals with specialist knowledge which most users lack, e.g., about property invest-
ment. It therefore required tenacity, knowledge and a serious investment o f time on 
the part o f tenants to participate actively. Yet many were either not able or unwilling 
to participate, at least not to the extent required to influence major organisational 
decisions effectively. This was because o f lack o f time, knowledge and/or confidence, 
or simply at times due to a lack o f perceived interest.2 When people who were users 
or recipients o f the services did participate, some managers expressed concern over 
how representative they were o f tenants. One manager noted that "it's always the 
same [people] who come along to things, you've probably met that, the articulate . . . " . 
Notions o f representative democracy were viewed as critical and were privileged over 
participative democracy. 
Only under certain specific conditions were a minority o f organisations found to 
be 'properly accountable' (Leat 1988) towards users. This was when there was an 
organisational culture o f cultivating voice and participation. This 'culture' occurred in 
only a small number o f organisations, where service users indicated they felt they 
2 A qualification is that there are various interpretations of when voice is effective. A com-
mon complaint o f managers is that users mostly address 'details', yet those may be what 
users care about most. Also, voice implies influence on decision making, yet dialogue may 
in itself strengthen relationships between users and providers by giving a sense o f shared 
concerns, even if the actual influence of users on decision making is limited. 
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were really being listened to. Indeed, at times, there was open disdain in relation to 
user voice participation in decision making. One housing manager laughed and said: 
Tenants have these rights of consent and advice, but we forget half the time. [...] 
Like when we entered [a merger]: we completely forgot to consult them! We rec-
tified it afterwards, but it hasn't improved our mutual relations. I've often told 
them, as bluntly as I tell you now: O f course I will submit this decision to you, 
but whatever you think of it, I'm going to do it anyway.' They can continue to 
play the game if they want, but it is only a game. 
5.2 Drivers underpinning new types of partnerships 
Overall, condidons were neither favourable for exit nor for voice. Yet this same 
environment was conducive for the emergence of new governance forms. Specifi-
cally, the new external environment created a high degree of interdependence be-
tween independent service providers, from the third sector and local government. 
Whilst the relationship between local government and landlords may at times 
have been antagonistic, it was virtually impossible or, at the very least, difficult for 
each party to avoid the other. Although landlords were in practice financially inde-
pendent, they could not embark on large-scale investment without the support of 
local government, because of both formal requirements (i.e., planning permission) 
and complementary investment in other public services necessary for making physical 
renovation effective. Local government could not engage in urban regeneration with-
out including organisations that both owned most of the housing stock in areas of 
high deprivation and could raise the necessary capital. Each party had specific assets 
that the other could not do without. Local government and social landlords increas-
ingly and necessarily therefore entered dialogue as the key mechanism of accountabil-
ity. Had it not been for a historically uncomfortable relationship and an uneasy tran-
sition, it is likely that dialogue would have deepened at an earlier stage. 
Whilst not part of the original system design, this inter-organisational dialogue 
was flawed in terms of accountability in that it was partial and excluded arguably the 
most important constituency to whom government and social housing organisations 
owe accountability - tenants. The reasons for this exclusion from the process and 
content of accountability are complex and the subject of a separate publication, as 
here we lack the space to discuss them in depth. 
6. Conclusion 
Our article examined public-private partnerships in social housing in The Nether-
lands and concluded that they did not function as originally designed. Whilst the 
main mechanisms of ensuring accountability between partners in the quasi-market -
exit and voice - were imperfect, accountability was found to be operating through a 
new form of inter-organisational accountability: the emergence and development of 
ongoing dialogue and enduring relationships within the context of local networks. 
This finding is quite striking, because public-private partnerships are generally estab-
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lished on the basis of a (quasi-) market system in which relationships are supposedly 
based on short-term contracting. 
Although similar issues are raised in the burgeoning literature on governance 
(for an overview please see Bevir et al. 2003) — particularly in terms of network gov-
ernance - the emergence of accountability relationships between local government 
and social landlords — based on mutual interdependence and dialogue rather than exit 
— have largely been overlooked. 
W e suggest that this might be because the original design of the partnerships 
rested upon a belief in a principal-agent relationship in which accountability of the 
agent to the principal was ensured through the exit mechanism. Considered from this 
perspective, enduring and horizontal relationships could be interpreted as market 
failure. However, that is only one side of the story. Many PPP that are formally con-
tractual in practice appear to be organisational in nature, sometimes in effect continu-
ing the essence of the former system of governance in the guise of a new one. 
Whilst it is not our intention to suggest that this is the only way that account-
ability relationships develop in a PPP, other social policy literature (see for instance 
Mackintosh 2000) suggests that a number of newly established partnerships may have 
developed in similar ways. This may be of interest in Germany because, if the condi-
tions for exit and voice are unfavourable, a number of accountability issues may arise 
in relation to public-private partnerships. Whilst future research is necessary to ascer-
tain whether 'relational accountability' holds up in other settings, we consider that the 
Dutch case sheds light on the challenges faced by partners when accountability is 
very dependent on collaboration and co-operation. As Romzek and Johnston (2005: 
446) note, accountability "looks very different in a system that is highly dependent on 
. . . co-operation than it does in a market like system". Partnerships, even when they 
are seemingly clear and unambiguous on paper, may be rather more dynamic and 
complex in practice. 
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